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While we know that women’s presence in the legislature positively impacts how citizens
view the institution, little is known about the impact of women’s presence on the
legitimacy of high courts. We argue that despite differences in public expectations for
courts, women’s presence on the high court does impact citizen perceptions of
legitimacy. However, this effect is dependent on both the level and the type of bias held
by citizens. That is, when a person feels hostile bias toward women, the bias disrupts the
potential legitimacy that the court could gain. On the other hand, we argue that
benevolent sexism does not trigger any change in how citizens view the high court in a
democracy. Using evidence from an experiment, we find that the presence of women on
the high court has a strong positive impact on citizen perceptions of court legitimacy,
though not among those with hostile gender bias.
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s more women justices join the benches of high courts across the
world, a substantial body of research has developed regarding the
circumstances under which women are appointed to these courts as well
as their judicial behavior once there. However, we know very little about
the impact of women’s presence on citizens’ perceptions of this
institution. The way that citizens perceive the high court is particularly
important because of the unique fragility of this institution — even the
strongest high courts in the world must be careful to consider the
impact of their decisions on the legitimacy of their institution before
they rule — and thus growing our understanding of the consequences of
women’s presence on the court is valuable for answering focused
questions about women’s access to power as well as broader questions
about institutional legitimacy.
There is reason to believe that women’s presence on the bench has a
positive effect on institutional legitimacy, but as much reason to suspect
that women’s presence will have no effect or even a negative impact on
court legitimacy. Existing literature on the effect of women’s presence in
the legislative and executive branches finds that gender balance does
indeed positively impact citizens’ views on the legitimacy of the
institution and of the state as a whole, which suggests that the
presence of more women justices may trigger a similar effect in the
judiciary. On the other hand, those effects may not hold for an
institution whose function is not representation. Courts, after all, are
not expected to be responsive to citizen demands in the same way as
other branches of government. Further, even if women on the high
court could generate legitimacy for the institution, the gender bias
held by citizens may undermine this potential effect; after all, if
citizens have a negative response to women in power, then it would be
unlikely for them to view women’s presence as a positive outcome for
the court.
We argue that women’s presence has a positive effect on the legitimacy
of the high court, though the effect is not constant: the level of legitimacy
generated by women on the court is tempered by sexist beliefs of citizens.
Specifically, we argue that only hostile bias negatively impacts this
cultivation of legitimacy. On the other hand, benevolent sexism, or the
more paternalistic version of sexism that triggers the believer to view
women as inherently good and pure, does not trigger a change in how
citizens view a high court in a democracy. Using data from a U.S.
MTurk experiment with nearly 1,000 participants, we find evidence that
women’s presence on the high court does indeed boost its legitimacy
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(consistent with the literature on women in elected branches), but the
effect decreases as an individual’s hostile sexism increases.
LEGITIMACY AND THE COURTS
The legitimacy of judicial institutions is critical given the limited resources
that courts have when it comes to enforcing their rulings. Courts are
typically regarded as the weakest branch of government, wielding control
of neither the sword nor the purse; they are dependent on other
branches and public support to give force to many of their decisions.
This support is not a given and does vary over time and circumstances
(see Whittington 2007). Legitimacy, in this context, has been described
as a “reservoir of good will” that can insulate the institution from
criticism when making unpopular decisions (Easton 1965). As we use it
here, legitimacy is distinct from immediate support for a particular
outcome in a case, and it is more accurately characterized as “diffuse
support” over the long term (Easton 1975). That is, “people who believe
specific decisions are wrong, even wrongheaded, and individual judges
unworthy of their office” will still accept court decisions when the court
as an institution is perceived as “generally impartial, just, and
competent” (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968, 359), “appropriate, proper,
and just” (Tyler 2006, 376), or possessing “the right (moral and legal) to
make decisions” (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 38).
The critical role of legitimacy in the ability of courts to function
effectively has spawned a substantial literature exploring its sources,
particularly focused on the U.S. Supreme Court. Some theories, such as
positivity theory, focus on ways in which the public’s assessment of
legitimacy increases with familiarity with the institution of the courts
(Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Gibson,
Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson and Nelson 2017). That is, the more
people learn about the role that courts are supposed to play in the
political system, the more favorably they view them, even if the outcomes
from those courts are not individually favorable.1
Scholars testing positivity theory measure legitimacy using a battery of
metrics primarily focused on resistance to changes in the structure of the
1. This approach is not without its critics. Bartels and Johnston (2013) and Johnston, Hillygus, and
Bartels (2014) find that subjective ideological disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court results in
a significant and negative impact on legitimacy in surveys of the public, a finding at odds with the
theoretical expectations of positivity theory. Gibson and Nelson (2014, 2017) offer a response
distinguishing between perceptions of an ideological court and a politicized court.
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institution (see, e.g., Gibson and Nelson 2017). Other theories address the
ways in which citizens use perceptions of procedural fairness to alter
evaluations of legitimacy (Tyler 1990, 2003, 2006).2 In this
understanding, when people believe that the process is fair, even if the
outcome is not substantively what they want, they are more likely to
regard those institutions as legitimate. Factors such as following ethical
principles of conduct, motivations to be fair, and the quality of decisions
made have an impact on perceptions of procedural fairness (Tyler 1990).
This is typically measured by evaluating respondents’ perceived
obligation to obey or affective orientation toward legal institutions (Tyler
and Huo 2002, 101–5).
A third cluster of research has centered on how descriptive representation
(Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967) can influence public perceptions of
legitimacy, though the bulk of this research has focused on legislatures
and executives. Scherer and Curry (2010) find that descriptive
representation does matter in courts, at least with regard to race. Using
an experiment focused on U.S. federal courts, they found that African
Americans’ evaluations of the legitimacy of courts increased when there
was greater descriptive representation. Looking beyond American courts,
Huebert and Liu (2017) found that ethnic representation in courts
changed the evaluations of legitimacy by indigenous peoples in Latin
America. Recognition of minority languages in courts can impact public
confidence as well (Liu and Baird 2012). In short, existing research on
descriptive representation has tested judicial legitimacy using several
different approaches, including the full battery of metrics associated with
positivity theory, trust in the courts, and confidence in the justice system
as captured in the World Values Survey.
All three of these approaches to understanding legitimacy in the courts
share an understanding of the centrality of democratic norms (Easton
1965; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Hoekstra 2000). The legitimacy
of the judiciary is inextricably linked to these norms, whether that
manifests as a democracy-supporting role, an institution embodying
shared norms of fairness and justice, or an institution that reflects the
composition of the underlying electorate. How might the composition of
high courts impact these perceptions of legitimacy?

2. It is worth noting that this approach is not necessarily at odds with positivity theory, but it does reflect
a different emphasis. See Tyler and Rasinski (1991) for a discussion of the connections and distinctions
between procedural fairness and legitimacy as characterized in Gibson’s research.
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WOMEN’S PRESENCE AND LEGITIMACY
There is an emerging consensus that women’s political presence enhances
the legitimacy of the institution that they are associated with, but the
common path of the literature is to focus on the executive and legislative
branches of government. Schwindt-Bayer (2010) and Schwindt-Bayer
and Alles (2018), for example, find evidence that the presence of women
in the legislature in Latin America correlates with citizen feelings of trust
in the legislature and greater satisfaction with the democracy as a whole.
And, if we expand the definition of legitimacy to include perceptions of
fairness and a lack of corruption, several studies demonstrate that the
presence of women leads voters to assume lower levels of corruption in
legislatures (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer
2018; Valdini 2019), police agencies (Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton
2018), and postconflict societies (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017).
The research that does engage the relationship between women’s
presence on the court and legitimacy directly is limited but growing.3
Grossman (2012) lays out a normative argument against
underrepresentation of women on international courts, linking it
explicitly with the descriptive representation literature. She argues that
overrepresentation of either men or women on courts is damaging to
legitimacy because people believe that men and women “think
differently,” leading to different results (Grossman 2012, 661). Using
case studies drawn from the United States and Europe, Kenney (2013)
likewise argues that gender plays a critical role in the courts for both
legitimacy and decision-making reasons, particularly because of the
benefits of diverse perspectives on the courts, but does not offer a test of
this association. Kirkpatrick, Kittilson, and Hoekstra (2020) put together
a symposium of articles on diversity in the judiciary, including
arguments that descriptive representation influences multiple
conceptions of justice (Dovi and Luna 2020) and that intersectionality
can offer a richer understanding of diversity on the bench (Kang et al.
2020). Arrington et al. (2021), Kang et al. (2021), Araya, Hughes, and
Pérez-Liñán (2021), and Valdini and Shortell (2016) all argue for the
3. Our interests are distinct from the more substantial literature on the effects of gender on judicial
decision-making. Gilligan’s (1982) work on differing voices along with subsequent evaluations of
this impact (see, e.g., Boyd 2013; Boyd, Epstein, Martin 2010; Harris and Sen 2019; Miller and
Maier 2008) suggest that women may approach judging differently than men in some
circumstances. This does not, however, speak directly to the perceptions of women judges by the
public, a topic that has received far less attention.

6

CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL AND MELODY E. VALDINI

value of gender diversity on courts, but they focus primarily on the methods
by which women end up on the bench.
Nelson (2015, 238) directly addresses citizen perceptions of women on
the bench in the United States and finds evidence that women judges are
subject to “double-bind” expectations, similar to those found in other areas
of public life, such that “heightened assessments of empathy are balanced
with lower assessments of judicial competence.” Particularly relevant to
our study, Nelson finds that whether gender matters in these evaluations
depends on the context: when making decisions that emphasize their
identities as women, the double bind is in effect, while it is not as
evident in decisions that do not emphasize gender identity. Thus, while
there is some evidence to suggest that the legitimacy of the court is
impacted by women’s presence, direct tests of this potential effect have
yet to be performed.
There is reason to believe that women’s presence on the high court may
have no impact on peoples’ perceptions of its legitimacy. The judicial
branch, after all, is not meant to rest on a foundation of representation; it
is the branch that stands outside the electoral pressures that elected
officials face. By design, the institutional purpose it serves is different
from the elected branches, though there are contested answers about
what that purpose is. Some argue that courts are meant to provide
horizontal accountability, keeping the other branches of government in
check in order to maintain and support the principles of limited
government (O’Donnell 1998). Building on this, courts can be seen as
primarily protecting the values of the constitution and upholding the
“rules of the game.” Other scholars describe courts as centrally focused
on resolving disputes as a third party, with a key emphasis on remaining
neutral in order to be effective (Shapiro 2013). Finally, courts could
simply be seen as the final step in the bureaucratic process of
adjudication designed by the political system. Because these roles and
responsibilities are so different from the elected branches, women’s
presence may not evoke the same citizen responses as legislatures and
executives. Thus, citizens may not notice the gender balance of the
court, and if they do notice, they might not care.

BIAS AND LEGITIMACY
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding whether the effect of women’s
presence in the legislative and executive branches will hold in the high
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court, existing literature on the cultivation of legitimacy has yet to examine
how citizen bias against women might change this effect. There is
substantial literature that demonstrates that voters make assumptions
based on candidate gender, and that many of these assumptions will
negatively impact women’s electoral success (Alexander and Andersen
1993; Eagly and Karau 2002; Fulton 2012; Fulton and Dhima 2020;
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; O’Brien and Rickne 2016; Schneider and
Bos 2014; Valdini 2013). The bias held by voters against women does
not necessarily manifest as openly hostile; rather, both hostile and
benevolent sexism have the potential to undermine citizens’ views about
the effectiveness and suitability of women in power (Glick and Fiske
1996). Thus, there is reason to believe that biased individuals may not
respond to women justices with increased feelings of trust in the court
and government (i.e., legitimacy).
Much of the literature on bias focuses on gender stereotypes and argues
that bias against women is a consequence of people holding traditional
views about women’s ideal roles, behaviors, and abilities. Specifically,
they offer evidence that some people both assume women to have more
“communal” qualities than men and feel more comfortable with women
who exhibit these expected traits (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Eagly
and Karau 2002; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002;
Spence and Buckner 2000). Communal traits are those associated with
traditional notions of femininity, such as being compassionate, careful,
cooperative, gentle, honest, and loyal. Building from that, there is a
growing body of literature that finds that women are associated with
democracy, so much so that their presence in government is successfully
used as a substitute for democratic procedures (Baldez 2004; Bush 2011;
Valdini 2019). Perhaps because of the stereotypes that women are
naturally more honest, cooperative, and thoughtful — that is, maternal
— some citizens believe that women are more “naturally” democratic
than men.
In addition, there is substantial literature on the differential impacts of
hostile versus benevolent bias on voter behavior. While both forms of
bias (also known as sexism) serve to justify women’s subordinate status
(Glick and Fiske 1996), they do so in very different ways: hostile bias
manifests as a belief that women are seeking to control (and overpower)
men through their sexuality or feminism, while benevolent bias
manifests as a more protective and even affectionate mechanism of
subjugation in which women are viewed as inherently pure and good as
well as weak and defenseless (Glick et al. 2000). Much of the recent
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work on the impact of these forms of bias on voter behavior offers
substantial evidence that sexism has a direct effect on voters’ support for
women candidates (Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton 2020; Cassese and
Barnes 2019; Cassese and Holman 2019; Ditonto 2019; Fulton and
Dhima 2020). There is, in short, little doubt that the level and type of
sexism held by voters is a key element to understanding their evaluations
of women candidates and their decisions in the voting booth.
However, while scholars have a clear picture of the general impact of
gender stereotypes on the evaluations of women politicians, as well as a
good understanding of how voter bias impacts the success of women
candidates, there is little existing work that examines the impact of
different levels and different types of bias on citizens’ perception of
institutions with women leaders. In other words, we know that citizens
make different assumptions about men and women in power, but we
know very little about how their gender bias affects their beliefs about
the value and functionality (i.e., legitimacy) of a governing institution
with a high presence of women leaders.
While all bias is potentially damaging to women’s equality, we argue that
only hostile bias negatively impacts the cultivation of legitimacy through
women’s presence on the court. That is, when a person feels negativity
toward women, this hostile bias disrupts the potential legitimacy that the
court or the state could gain from women’s presence on the bench. For
example, if a person believes that women are evil or manipulative — that
is, they demonstrate hostile bias against women — then women on the
high court will not be seen as valuable additions to the institution, and
thus the legitimacy of the institution may suffer. That being said, the
literature on bias and stereotypes demonstrates that these factors often
manifest in context-dependent and fluid ways, and thus we suspect that
the effect of hostile bias on legitimacy may not be consistent.
We would not expect benevolent sexism, though, to have this same
negative effect. Since this type of sexism triggers the believer to view
women as inherently good and pure, there is no reason to predict a
decrease in perceptions of high court legitimacy among those holding
these views. And there is no reason to predict an increase in legitimacy
either; we argue that because of the democratic context, the positive
stereotypes that benevolent sexists hold are not seen as particularly
important and thus will not impact their perception of court legitimacy.
In short, the impact of stereotypes on voter behavior is fluid and contextdependent (Falk and Kenski 2006; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister
2016; Lawless 2004; Valdini 2019), so when a high court is in a stable
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democracy, women’s communal traits and “natural” proclivity toward
democracy will not be seen as necessary and thus will not change the
appraisal of the institution.
TESTING: METHODS
To examine the effect of bias and justice gender balance on the legitimacy
of the court, we administered a survey of U.S. residents in April 2018. We
selected the United States as a case study for testing this theory for several
reasons. First, the United States is regarded as one of the most stable
democracies in the world, offering a consistent form of government over
a long period of time. Citizens can be expected to have some familiarity
with the norms and operations of this style of government. Second, the
United States has a longer tradition than any other country of allowing
the apex court to engage in judicial review of statutes and executive
branch actions. This has made the U.S. Supreme Court in particular
more visible than the judiciary in many countries. Finally, the United
States has been the subject of the most extensive research regarding
gender and judging, so it provides a strong theoretical foundation from
which to develop testing. While our interests extend beyond the context
of the United States alone, it offers an important starting point for
evaluating whether public perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by
the gender composition of the courts.
Our survey was conducted via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) service in April 2018. All respondents were U.S. residents over
age 18, and we required a “HIT approval rate” from previous requesters’
jobs of over 95% for participation. We provided a payment of $1 to all
respondents who successfully completed the survey and did not fail the
robot test (see Appendix I in the supplementary material online for the
full survey). In all, 940 respondents successfully completed the survey.
While the respondents did skew young, left-wing, and well-educated, we
were able to get sufficient demographic variation (see Appendix II for a
table showing the demographic breakdown of the sample).4
After accepting participation in the survey, respondents were randomly
assigned to one of three groups. Each group was then given a oneparagraph description of the current high court in the anonymous
4. While not ideal, MTurk samples are more representative of the American population than other
types of convenience samples and experiments (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; Huff and
Tingley 2015; Mullinix et al. 2015).

10

CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL AND MELODY E. VALDINI

country.5 In each group, we offered the same description of a high court in
an anonymous stable democracy. We chose to specify the court as being in
another country to avoid tapping too directly into attitudes of specific
support about U.S. courts that might reflect responses to recent court
decisions rather than underlying attitudes. However, we did not want to
vary the political system too far beyond what respondents might be
familiar with, so we made sure to specify that this anonymous country
was also a stable democracy like the United States. The descriptions were
the same across the three groups, with one key difference: we varied the
gender balance of judges on the anonymous high court. We offered
three different justice gender scenarios: in the first, there were six men
and one woman on the court. In the second, there were four men and
three women on the court. And in the third, there were six women and
one man on the court. Thus, our independent variable is categorical and
has three possible values.6 We did not strongly emphasize the gender of
the judges, but rather mixed that material in with supplementary
information about the judicial selection mechanism and term length.7
After reading the assigned paragraph, respondents were given six
questions designed to elicit their opinion on the likelihood of that court
achieving goals usually associated with the idealized high court. These
were, in short, our operationalization of legitimacy, and thus designed to
pick up very different facets of the idealized high court. While the
existing literature on the legitimacy of judicial institutions frequently uses
the well-respected measurement of Gibson, Caleira, and Spence (2003),
our questions were designed to elicit responses to more specific functions
and attributes of the high court. By focusing on specific aspects of the
court (e.g., will the court treat parties who try a case fairly, will the court
issue a fair ruling if a government official is accused of corruption, etc.),
we were able to test and isolate whether women’s presence on the court
affected a specific aspect of the court’s legitimacy. This is particularly
important because our theory rests on the use of stereotypes and bias,
which have been demonstrated to manifest in fluid, uneven ways. This is
also why we avoided combining the measures of legitimacy into a single
cumulative scale; our goal was to parse exactly which aspect of the
5. We attempted to establish that the country was not the United States by describing a judicial
selection method that is quite different from the U.S. system of selecting Supreme Court justices.
6. In addition to running this model with our main independent variable coded as categorical, we also
ran it with our independent variable as a series of dichotomous measurements; our results remained the
same.
7. All three scenarios are presented in Appendix I.

THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S PRESENCE ON HIGH COURTS

11

respondents evaluation changed when faced with women on the court, and
our concern was that a broad or cumulative measure focused on general
satisfaction or trust may not pick up the nuances of peoples’ reactions to
women on the court. That being said, as a nod to the work of Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence (2003), we did include a general question on
whether the court could be trusted.8
Following the completion of the six questions central to our analysis, we
transitioned to collecting control variables. These included the standard
demographic variables — age, gender, ideology, education, party
identification — as well as two sets of questions designed to capture the
respondents’ other personal beliefs about high courts. We assumed that
respondents who look favorably on the U.S. Supreme Court would have
more positive feelings about courts in general, and thus we included a
control for that as well.
In addition, the final section of the MTurk survey utilized five questions
from the benevolent/hostile sexism battery created by Glick and Fiske
(1996). For example, we included a question that asked how much the
respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement that “women tend to
exaggerate problems at work” — which is classified as hostile sexism — as
well as questions designed to pick up benevolent sexism (e.g., agree or
disagree with the statement that “women should be cherished and
protected by men”).9 Respondents answered each question on a 6-point
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
Table 1 offers the results of six models, each with a different
operationalization of legitimacy. All of our dependent variables — that is,
the respondents’ opinions on various measures of the legitimacy of the
described court — are ordered, categorical variables with low values that
denote negative feelings about legitimacy and high values that denote
more positive feelings. Our primary independent variable, women
justices, is a categorical variable with three values (fully explained in our
discussion of treatments earlier); a higher value denotes the presence of
8. We are conscious of the risk of simply capturing attitudes regarding recent case outcomes related to
specific rather than diffuse support. To address this, and to increase our potential generalizability
beyond the United States, we purposefully identified a court other than one in the United States.
While we expect that we will still be capturing attitudes about domestic courts, something controlled
for in a separate variable, those attitudes should not be as closely aligned to specific support of the
U.S. Supreme Court or even appellate courts in the United States. We do adopt one of the key
metrics from positivity theory, trust in the court, as part of our tests of legitimacy. As with Huebert
and Liu (2017), we regard trust as a particularly important measure of legitimacy when
differentiating the sources of trust in courts rather than specific vs. diffuse support as an outcome.
9. The full text of the questions used can be found in Appendix I.
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Ordered probit results: Perception of high court legitimacy with hostile bias

Women justices
Ideology
Gender
Age
Education
U.S. court fairness
Hostile bias
Hostile bias * Women
justices
N
χ2
Pseudo R 2

Model 1
(Justice
Served)

Model 2
(Trust Level)

Model 3
(Fair Ruling)

Model 4
(Judicial
Review)

Model 5
(Democracy
Health)

Model 6
(Fair
Court)

0.232**
(0.099)
0.010
(0.023)
–0.057
(0.073)
0.005*
(0.003)
–0.019
(0.041)
0.520***
(0.034)
0.035
(0.073)

0.245**
(0.102)
–0.002
(0.024)
0.018
(0.075)
–0.001
(0.003)
–0.002
(0.042)
0.658***
(0.037)
0.041
(0.076)

0.191**
(0.096)
0.018
(0.022)
–0.043
(0.071)
0.003
(0.003)
0.015
(0.040)
0.526***
(0.037)
0.010
(0.071)

0.227***
(0.097)
–0.004
(0.023)
–0.121*
(0.071)
0.004
(0.003)
0.016
(0.040)
0.572***
(0.034)
0.069
(0.072)

0.165*
(0.097)
0.001
(0.023)
–0.087
(0.071)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.032
(0.040)
0.487***
(0.034)
–0.006
(0.072)

0.213**
(0.097)
0.016
(0.023)
–0.110
(0.071)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.011
(0.040)
0.528***
(0.034)
0.059
(0.072)

–0.047
(0.037)
940
258.92
0.101

Ordered probit with standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10.

–0.052
(0.035)
940
351.87
0.158

–0.043
(0.033)
940
272.05
0.093

–0.076**
(0.033)
940
318.15
0.112

–0.035
(0.033)
940
241.53
0.088

–0.066**
(0.033)
940
277.51
0.100
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more women on the high court. In addition to the standard control
variables, we include one variable that captures the respondent’s general
feelings about the U.S. Supreme Court, referred to as U.S. court fairness
in the models. Finally, to examine whether individual bias changes the
relationship between women’s presence on the high court and
perceptions of legitimacy of the institution, our models include
responses to the question of whether women exaggerate problems at
work as a measure of an individual’s gender bias, as well as an
interaction of gender bias with the number of women on the high
court.10 Due to our categorical dependent variable, we use ordered
probits to estimate the models. While the coefficients cannot be directly
interpreted, the significance and direction of the coefficients offer insight
into the relationships among these variables.
Table 1 offers the results of our ordered probits. We find a significant
positive relationship between the presence of women on the court and
nearly all perceptions of legitimacy.11 These results clearly suggest that
women’s presence positively impacts the perception of legitimacy of the
high court.
The effect of bias, on the other hand, is more complicated: our variables
capturing benevolent sexism (and their interactions with the presence of
women on the court) did not attain statistical significance in any of our
models and are not included in Table 1, while the questions capturing
hostile bias, when interacted with women’s presence, did reach
conventional levels of significance in two models. This result offers
support for our theory that different types of bias will trigger citizens to
respond to women justices in different ways. Further, it suggests that
even within a single type of bias, there may be differences in exactly how
that bias affects the response to the presence of women on the court.
That is, there is a significant effect of hostile bias only in response to two
of the six measurements of court legitimacy: bias changes the
respondents’ beliefs about the impact of women’s presence on the court
only when we ask about the court’s ability to conduct “fair and
unbiased” judicial review and the likelihood that the court will “treat
parties who try a case before the court fairly,” but not when focused on
10. The “women exaggerate” question is used because it is particularly relevant to perceptions
regarding women judges since it implies a willingness to lie, a characteristic ill-suited to the
legitimacy of courts. Using the “women are easily offended” question instead does not change the
significance.
11. This is true even in models that do not account for gender bias, though the inclusion of that
variable improves the fit of the model.
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FIGURE 1. Respondent evaluation of likelihood of effective judicial review on
high court with majority women, by level of hostile bias.

the overall health of the democracy, the general trust in the court, the
fairness of rulings on corrupt officials, and the ability of the court to
ensure that justice is served. This variation suggests that there may not be
a simple blanket response of citizens with hostile bias to women justices
on the court, but rather that the hostility causes them to doubt some, but
not all, aspects of court legitimacy.
To better understand the impact of the presence of women on the court
and its relationship with hostile bias, we offer the predicted probabilities
generated from one of these models in Figure 1.
Figure 1 offers a visual representation of predicted probabilities
generated from Model 4 on judicial review (please note that the full
table of all predicted probabilities from Model 4 is available in Appendix
III). The y-axis represents the probability that a respondent will give a
certain answer to the following question: “One of the most important
jobs of the high court is to determine whether or not a law is
unconstitutional. Do you believe that this court will review laws in a fair
and unbiased way?” The x-axis represents the level of hostile bias
expressed by the respondent, where the low end of the scale indicates
low bias and the high end indicates high bias against women. Each line
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represents a different answer to the y-axis question, but only under
conditions of a majority-women high court. For example, the line
marked with squares presents the probabilities that a respondent, when
faced with a court of six women and one man, will say that it is “likely”
that the court will review laws in a fair and unbiased way.
As expected by our theory, respondents change their views on the court
depending on their level of hostile bias: the probability that someone will
answer “likely” and “very likely,” for example, decreases as bias increases.
On the other hand, the probability that someone answers “unlikely” or
“very unlikely” that the court will review laws in a fair and unbiased way
increases with hostile bias against women. These results suggest that the
effect of women’s presence on the legitimacy of the high court is not the
same for all citizens, and that sexism must be taken into consideration
when predicting the effect of women’s presence on institutional legitimacy.

CONCLUSION
Our findings indicate that gender is a significant consideration in public
evaluations of the legitimacy of democratic courts; in the context of a wellfunctioning democracy, the mere presence of women is enough to alter
an evaluation of whether justice will be served or the court can be trusted.
Of particular interest, though, is the contextual nature of this influence:
the presence of hostile sex bias moderates the otherwise positive influence.
In short, our evidence suggests that the gender of judges does matter for
perceptions of the legitimacy of the high court, although it is potentially
attenuated by underlying hostile attitudes toward women.
The implications of this research are substantial and multifaceted. First,
it advances the literature on court legitimacy by incorporating judicial
demographics into the analysis. This moves beyond the existing studies
on descriptive representation to highlight the interaction between
perceptions of gender and perceptions of legitimacy by the public. That
is, we argue that legitimacy increases not just because people feel that
the makeup of the court is representative of the underlying population
but also because the characteristics associated with women reinforce the
norms associated with democratic courts. While complementary to
theories like positivity theory and procedural fairness, this opens up
significant areas of future research in this area that more accurately
capture the nuances and interactions underlying measures of court
legitimacy.
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In addition, our research has implications for the gender and politics
literature. It is consistent with the growing literature demonstrating that
stereotypical attributes of women are important to account for in
evaluating the impact of their presence in government; these impressions
matter in democracies across different institutional contexts. At the same
time, it also highlights the importance in treating measures of sexism in
nuanced ways. Hostile and benevolent sexism, though both barriers to
women’s equality, do not operate in the same way in the public.
Measures that combine these distinct perspectives on women may miss
underlying variations that are important to recognize, particularly as they
relate to stereotypical characteristics. If stereotypes play an important
causal role in public perceptions, those may operate differently
depending on whether they are hostile or benevolent.
Another important implication of our results concerns the incentives
that male elites have to increase the descriptive representation of women
for reasons other than a desire for gender equality. As Weeks (2018) and
Valdini (2019) discuss, the inclusion of more women in power seems to
run counter to the rational interests of the male elite class, so there must
be more to this story — that is, what are those in power getting out of
women’s increased presence? Our results suggest that in democracies,
the presence of women on the high court can trigger an increase in the
perceptions of legitimacy of the court. This means, in short, that the state
can benefit from the signal that women’s presence sends.
This research, while promising, remains preliminary. We have been
careful to limit our conclusions to democracies given that our survey
was conducted in the United States. Future research should engage
the effect of regime type; because our conceptualization of sexism
rests on the fluid value of stereotypes, a hybrid or authoritarian
context may change the value of stereotypes associated with women,
thereby causing different behavior compared with the democratic
context. In short, it is possible that citizens in nondemocratic contexts
might have a different response to women judges, which could
change the relationship between bias and legitimacy. Additionally, this
study focused on apex courts. Extending this evaluation to perceptions
of lower courts would also be valuable given the differing expectations
that the public may have for trial court judges compared with
appellate judges. Nonetheless, the results clearly demonstrate the
value in pursuing this further and offer insight into a previously
underexamined aspect of courts and gender.
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